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SHOULD THE LEFT DISSENT? 
PRACTICAL EQUALITY:  FORGING JUSTICE IN A 
DIVIDED NATION.  By Robert L. Tsai.1 W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2019.  Pp. 276. $27.95 (Cloth). 
Nelson Tebbe2 
I. 
When a political community is as polarized as America is 
today, people on the left often will be unable to protect core 
principles, such as equal membership, basic liberty, and 
distributive justice. They will find themselves thwarted by 
opponents who are unable or unwilling to embrace an egalitarian 
vision. (And conservatives will face a converse challenge, of 
course.) This situation is difficult, to say the least. Not only is 
political polarization unpleasant, but it can impede the 
functioning of democratic self-governance. 
In his creative and beautifully articulated book, Practical 
Equality: Forging Justice in a Divided Nation, Robert L. Tsai 
suggests a way forward. To his main question, “[w]hat is to be 
done to confront injustice when the timing doesn’t seem right or 
the odds are stacked against you?,” Tsai responds that egalitarians 
should pursue “equality by other means” (p. 3). Practical equality 
describes a method or strategy of embracing second-best solutions 
when ideal outcomes are unattainable. Constitutional concepts 
that can approximate equality include procedural due process, 
rationality review, the prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment, and freedom of expression. Pursing these 
alternatives is smart strategy, for Tsai, but it is also required by 
“constitutional duty” or moral obligation (p. 7). Moreover, 
practical equality can produce consensus, or at least majority 
support, for an outcome, partly because its techniques do not 
 
 1.  Professor of Law, American University.  
 2.  Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Thanks to Micah Schwartzman for 
comments on an earlier version. 
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require a finding of bias on the part of government 
decisionmakers.3 
Tsai’s first example is President Trump’s signature travel 
ban. The outlines of this story are well known. Soon after he was 
inaugurated in January of 2017, Trump fulfilled his campaign 
promise to effectuate a “total and complete shutdown” on Muslim 
travel to the United States.4 He signed an executive order that 
effectively excluded travel into the country by citizens of several 
Muslim-majority nations, among other measures.5 Chaos ensued 
at airports and other ports of entry, lawyers brought challenges, 
and courts quickly invalidated the executive order. Shortly 
thereafter, Trump issued a revised ban, which also was quickly 
invalidated.6 Courts offered different rationales for these 
judgments. Some judges held that the travel ban violated 
immigration statutes, others found violations of due process, and 
still others decided that Trump had discriminated against Muslims 
in violation of the Establishment Clause.7 Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court upheld the third and final version of the travel 
ban.8 Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the executive’s 
decisions on immigration issues deserved deference, and that the 
administration’s findings were sufficient to satisfy that deferential 
review, irrespective of any impermissible bias against Muslims 
that might have motivated Trump, who was the sole lawmaker in 
this situation.9 
 
 3.  On consensus, see infra note 44. Tsai takes equality law as he finds it, probably 
for pragmatic reasons. See, e.g., p. 81 (“Who exactly was doing the discriminating [in 
McCleskey]? . . . One couldn’t simply say ‘the system,’ at least not without dramatically 
altering the way that equality questions had long been resolved.”). Another strategy would 
be to imagine a different and more substantive equal protection jurisprudence, one that 
would protect vulnerable groups against government policies that have a disparate impact 
on them. That would allow courts to rule against the government without having to find 
that officials acted with a discriminatory motive. Cf. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection 
No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Based State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
1111, 1113-14 (1997) (arguing that the equal protection requirement of discriminatory 
purpose may be an example of “preservation through transformation”). 
 4.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018). 
 5.  Executive Order No. 13769, Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry 
Into the United States. 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (2017). 
 6.  Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, 82 
Fed. Reg. 13209 (2017). 
 7.  See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (due process); Hawaii 
v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (statutory grounds); Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (Establishment Clause). 
 8.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 9.  Id. at 2420–21. 
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How should a practical egalitarian handle such a case? Tsai 
notes that a group of law professors argued that the travel ban was 
motivated by religious animus and therefore violated the 
Establishment Clause (p. 10 & n.3).10 Tsai does not endorse that 
approach.11 Instead, he prefers the ruling of the Ninth Circuit, 
which reasoned that the travel ban violated due process in various 
ways, such as by altering the rights of green card holders without 
giving them notice and an opportunity to be heard (pp. 75-76).12 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision was “textbook use of alternative 
means to promote equality” and it was productive because it 
“repeatedly forced the administration to modify a deeply unequal 
policy,” so that ultimately three countries were dropped from the 
ban and several exemptions were created (p. 79). Anything more 
would be too much to ask of courts, Tsai suggests, because judges 
“can’t stop ethnonationalist agendas on their own”—that can only 
be done through raw politics (p. 80). 
Tsai’s argument has significant power. Where full equality 
cannot be achieved because of implacable opposition, it makes 
good sense to support rationales that can relieve suffering to some 
degree. Think of Justice Kennedy’s decision to protect LGBT 
people against discrimination using rational basis review without 
deciding whether they constituted a suspect class, at an early 
moment when taking that step likely would have sparked 
opposition that would have been significant and probably 
disabling.13 Moreover, second-best solutions can sometimes pave 
the way for first-best solutions. These reminders are particularly 
valuable in our historical moment, when egalitarians are likely to 
face significant obstacles, particularly in courts. In issuing them, 
Tsai is building on an argument for constitutional borrowing that 
we made together in an earlier article.14 I am delighted to be 
 
 10.  For the Supreme Court version of the amicus brief, see Brief of Constitutional 
Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Trump v. Hawaii, 2018 WL 
1605673 (March 30, 2018). I was one of the principal authors of that brief, which we filed 
in several courts. 
 11.  He suggests that although it would be easy to become “enamored” with the 
straightforward equality argument, “that’s a mistake” because serious arguments existed 
on the other side, including the government’s contention that the travel ban was necessary 
to protect national security (p. 3). 
 12.  Discussing Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). 
 13.  Cf. pp. 131-32, offering Romer v. Evans, 519 U.S. 620 (1996), as “the perfect 
roadmap for equality by other means.” 
 14.  See p. 239 n.37, citing Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 459 (2010). 
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associated with Tsai in this way, though I take no credit for his 
work in this book, which is entirely original, characteristically 
careful, and admirably constructive. 
Yet there is another way that egalitarians could respond to 
nonideal conditions, one that receives less attention in Practical 
Equality—they could dissent. Tsai is focused almost exclusively 
on the judiciary in this work, and his unit of analysis is a court, 
taken as a decisionmaking body. That focus makes sense given his 
audience, which seems to include both lawyers on the left who are 
seeking outcomes in litigation and members of the political 
community who are urging and evaluating judicial action. But a 
consequence of that choice is that he does not separately address 
sympathetic judges, and he does not centrally consider what their 
responsibilities or best strategies might be, when faced with 
conservative colleagues who will outnumber them or appellate 
courts who will overrule them. Should egalitarian judges who find 
themselves unable to achieve ideal outcomes also engage in 
practical equality, or should they dissent? 
Think furthermore about constitutional actors outside of 
courts—in legislatures, administrative agencies, local 
governments, nonprofit organizations, educational institutions, 
media outlets, social movements, and political mobilizations. 
Egalitarians in these settings also regularly make constitutional 
arguments, and they regularly face obstacles. Should they seek 
equality by other means, or should they forcefully urge an 
alternative constitutional vision of what full and equal 
membership in the democratic community looks like in a society 
that is well ordered and just? 
To ask these questions is not to answer them. Likely, the 
effectiveness of various constitutional strategies will vary by 
context. But considering these issues opens up an important 
discussion about the comparative merits and demerits of different 
approaches—a discussion that I imagine Tsai will welcome. One 
of these approaches is “equality by other means”; another is 
dissent. 
II. 
A scenario in which it might be better for constitutional 
actors to dissent is where disagreement is necessary to manage the 
range of acceptable arguments and outcomes. In the situation I 
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am imagining, embracing a second-best solution makes 
egalitarian arguments seem extreme or radical. That cost may be 
too great, especially where the outcome is not in question because 
the opposition is certain to prevail, but perhaps also in some 
situations where the outcome is uncertain. 
On this view, there is at any given moment a range of 
constitutional positions that carry authority or weight with the 
relevant decisionmaker. Outside that range, positions are 
considered unthinkable or at least unserious. Theorists sometimes 
refer to this category of recognized arguments as the Overton 
Window.15 Jack Balkin describes something similar when he 
argues that some constitutional arguments count as “on the wall” 
at any given historical moment, whereas others are “off the 
wall.”16 Interpretations can move back and forth between 
unacceptable and acceptable, unthinkable and thinkable. 
Moreover, the size of the window can be expanded or contracted, 
and the entire window can move leftward or rightward, to use 
crude political terms. The mechanisms by which these changes 
occur are complex, contingent, and at least partially extralegal. 
Regardless, the key insight is that the breadth and location of the 
range of colorable interpretations can have profound effect on 
constitutional conflicts. 
Where the outcome of a particular dispute is certain to be 
inegalitarian, shirking from dissent can have deleterious effects on 
the acceptability of equality arguments. It can isolate those 
constitutional interpretations, casting them as immoderate. Over 
time, that impression can prove meaningful, if not on in litigation 
itself than in the wider sphere of constitutional politics where the 
Court is the dominant player. 
Under conditions of political polarization, moreover, 
conservative interpretations are likely to shift rightward (just as 
liberal positions are shifting leftward, though not necessarily 
 
 15.  See Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Coherentism, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
363, 393–94 (2015) (“Joseph Overton observed that in a given public policy area, such as 
education, only a relatively narrow range of potential policies will be considered politically 
acceptable.”) (citing The Overton Window: A Model of Policy Change, MACKINAC CTR. 
FOR PUB. POL’Y, www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow). 
 16.  Jack M. Balkin, From off the Wall to on the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge 
Went Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/
national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-
went-main-stream/258040 (describing how arguments once considered “off the wall” 
become “on the wall” through contestation and argument). 
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symmetrically).17 If egalitarians on the Court respond by 
embracing second-best solutions that are less likely to be divisive 
and more likely to win converts among conservatives, that could 
promote a rightward shift of the range of acceptable outcomes. By 
contrast, a practice of persistent dissent could stabilize the range 
of recognized positions, or at least force it to expand rather than 
simply shift. 
Outside courts, egalitarians on the left face choices that are 
analogous though not identical. If they know that they will be 
unable to obtain a particular outcome—an assumption I will relax 
in a minute—then pursuing equality by other means may come 
with a cost. Voicing strong dissent, by contrast, might help to 
preserve plausibility for positions on questions of justice that then 
will have a better chance of carrying the day sometime in the 
future. 
As an example, return to the travel ban case.18 There, the 
Supreme Court upheld (the third and final version of) Trump’s 
restriction on travel from certain countries to the United States. 
Writing for a narrow majority of five votes, Chief Justice Roberts 
applied a deferential standard of review to the executive action, 
insulating it against the claim that Trump had acted out of 
animosity toward Muslims in violation of the Establishment 
Clause. Because the case concerned immigration and national 
security, that is, Roberts reasoned that the travel ban should be 
upheld if it could be supported by legitimate national security 
concerns, independent of any unconstitutional motives, and he 
found that it could be supported that way.19 He therefore put to 
one side the history of statements by Trump that strongly 
suggested that his effort to craft a travel ban was driven by 
unconstitutional bias against Muslims.20 
Tsai seems to suggest that the majority opinion, 
“disappointing though it may have been,” was the best we could 
have hoped for from courts (pp. 79-80). By the time the Supreme 
Court ruled, the due process defects had been ameliorated, if not 
 
 17.  Cf.  Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. 915, 918 (2018) (analogizing to “asymmetric polarization” in politics). 
 18.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 19.  Id. at 2420–21.  
 20.  See id. at 2416–18 (describing Trump’s statements regarding the travel ban, 
including that he intended to effect a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering 
the United States”). 
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completely eliminated, and without the need to accuse the 
president of acting out of antireligious animus. 
Yet imagine what the effect would have been if some of the 
dissenters—say, Justices Breyer and Kagan—had adopted this 
rationale in a concurrence or even joined the majority opinion. As 
it was, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, wrote a dissent in 
which he argued that the administration may well have been 
applying the ban’s many exemptions in a manner that bolstered 
the animus conclusion, and he called for a remand to explore that 
evidence further.21 However, he also said clearly that if a remand 
were impossible, he would set aside the travel ban on the basis of 
the president’s statements, as documented by Justice Sotomayor 
in her separate dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg.22 If Justices 
Breyer and Kagan had not dissented, they would have isolated 
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion, and they would have further 
marginalized the argument that Trump in fact promulgated the 
final travel ban as part of a sustained effort to exclude Muslims, 
exactly as he had promised during his campaign.23 
After all, the Ninth Circuit’s due process opinion was not the 
only source of constitutional resistance to the travel ban, nor was 
it the most prominent or persistent one. The Fourth Circuit also 
repeatedly found against Trump’s program, and it did so on 
straightforward Establishment Clause grounds, holding that the 
president likely had acted out of “animus toward Islam.”24 It’s far 
from clear—to me, at least—that the administration revised the 
travel ban solely in response to the Ninth Circuit’s due process 
ruling, when the Fourth Circuit had also been holding that the ban 
likely violated the Constitution. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s 
later rulings, against versions two and three of the travel ban, 
abandoned the due process argument and substituted statutory 
 
 21.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2433 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 22.  Id. (“If this Court must decide the question without this further litigation, I 
would, on balance, find the evidence of antireligious bias, including statements on a 
website taken down only after the President issued the two executive orders preceding the 
Proclamation, along with the other statements also set forth in Justice Sotomayor’s 
opinion, a sufficient basis to set the Proclamation aside.”). 
 23.  This is not to say that Justice Breyer’s opinion did not already fracture the 
dissent. It is to say only that failing to dissent would have done even more to promote the 
impression that Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg were outliers. 
 24.  Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 257 (4th Cir. 2018) (en 
banc); see also Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 597 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(finding the plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause 
challenge to the second version of the travel ban). 
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grounds.25 So it’s possible that some of the credit that Tsai claims 
for practical equality should actually go to first-best 
egalitarianism, rather than to second-best approaches.26 
Contrast the travel ban case to Masterpiece Cakeshop, which 
was decided the same month and which also turned on a claim of 
religious animosity.27 There, the Court ruled for Jack Phillips, a 
Christian baker who refused to provide a wedding cake for the 
celebration of Charlie Craig and David Mullins, who were 
planning a celebration of their marriage. The Court reasoned, in 
part, that Colorado officials had relied on antireligious “hostility” 
when they ruled in the couple’s favor, because two state officials 
had made remarks about religion that the Court considered to be 
disparaging.28 I want to put aside the merits of that controversial 
holding and focus instead on the votes of Justices Kagan and 
Breyer. They joined the majority because, as Justice Kagan 
explained, they agreed that Colorado officials had not showed 
Phillips “neutral and respectful consideration.”29 Their signatures 
made the decision 7-2, with only Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg 
dissenting. 
Justices Kagan and Breyer might have been pursuing a form 
of practical equality. They could well have counted noses after 
oral argument and concluded that Jack Phillips was going to 
prevail. (Certainly, I had that sense on reading the transcript.) 
And they might further have calculated that a narrow decision 
based on the unusual evidence of bias in Colorado was preferable 
to a broad holding that religious objectors have a presumptive 
 
 25.  See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 761 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that the second 
version of the travel ban violated the Immigration and Naturalization Act); Hawaii v. 
Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that the third version of the travel ban also 
violated statutory immigration law). 
 26.  Admittedly, several of the improvements Tsai mentions were procedural, but 
several others appeared designed to defend against the accusation of religious 
discrimination. Adding North Korea and Venezuela to the list of banned countries, in 
particular, blunted the force of the argument that every country on the list was virtually 
entirely Muslim. That “the President’s inclusion of North Korea and Venezuela does little 
to mitigate the anti-Muslim animus that permeates the” travel ban doesn’t mean those 
additions weren’t designed to do just that. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2442 (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting). 
 27.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Com’n,  138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018). 
 28.  Id. at 1731. Whether the comments were in fact disparaging has been questioned. 
Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 
138–43 (2018). 
 29.  Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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right to exemptions from core civil rights laws. Rather than 
dissenting, then, they sought to shape a majority opinion that was 
as narrow as possible—Justice Kagan even wrote separately, 
joined by Justice Breyer, to urge an interpretation of the majority 
opinion that avoided one particularly broad reading.30 Even if that 
wasn’t exactly equality by other means—Craig and Mullins lost, 
after all—it could have counted as practical equality, because it 
might have helped to blunt an opinion that otherwise would have 
been more damaging. 
Yet the strategy came with a cost. Making the Masterpiece 
vote 7-2 isolated the strong dissent by Justice Ginsburg, joined by 
Justice Sotomayor. It marginalized their perspective, which 
otherwise might have drawn four votes. That dynamic may well 
influence the Court when a wedding vendor case returns to the 
Court, as it surely will, or indeed whenever the Court next 
confronts any similar tension between religious freedom and 
equality law. Now, that cost may be overborne by the benefits of 
the strategy I am imaging for Justices Breyer and Kagan. My only 
point here is that when we are evaluating options in a nonideal 
world, our evaluation should be comparative—it ought to include 
the option of dissent. 
A pattern is emerging, at least in religious freedom cases. 
Justices Breyer and Kagan are forging a position, or a set of 
positions, somewhere between the majority on the right and the 
dissenting justices to their left. Of course, it is possible that they 
are doing this for entirely principled reasons, and with no thought 
for judicial strategy. But it is also possible that Breyer and Kagan 
believe their approach has instrumental advantages even on a 
Court where Justice Kennedy has been replaced by Justice 
Kavanaugh, and where Chief Justice Roberts now sits near the 
center of the balance of power—a center that has shifted 
appreciably to the right.31 
Perhaps they believe that they can slowly bring Roberts 
along by building trust and solidarity with him incrementally—in 
a series of cases rather than all at once. Guided by the examples 
of how Justices Souter or Kennedy became less conservative over 
the course of their judicial careers, Justices Breyer and Kagan 
 
 30.  Id. at 1733–34. For a different rejection of that reading, see Lawrence G. Sager 
& Nelson Tebbe, The Reality Principle, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 171 (2019). 
 31.  Of course, it is also conceivable that Justices Breyer and Kagan are acting out of 
some complicated mix of principled and pragmatic rationales. 
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may believe that they can sway Roberts through force of reason 
and moral suasion, if and only if they can avoid sparking a 
defensive reaction. But what if they are wrong? What if Roberts 
turns out to be a very different thinker from Souter or Kennedy, 
sitting on a transformed Court, at a markedly distinct political and 
historical moment? That possibility has to be considered. 
III. 
Tsai has addressed some related matters, and he’s done so 
with characteristic elegance and exactitude. Most importantly, he 
rejects the strategies of “deferral” and “appeasement” and he 
distinguishes them from practical equality (p. 6). 
Deferral means putting off equality enforcement so that 
public opinion and cultural attitudes have time to adjust, and so 
“legal rulings seem more democratic and are less likely to be 
openly defied” (p. 4). That approach sounds reasonable, in the 
nonideal world that he addresses, but Tsai is quite skeptical. He 
believes the costs of delay are often underestimated and generally 
too high for those suffering from unjust practices (p. 5).32 
Moreover, the strategy introduces considerable uncertainty, 
because attitudes may never progress sufficiently to allow 
enforcement (p. 5). Referring once more to the example of the 
travel ban, Tsai argues that travelers and especially refugees 
should not suffer uncertainty or indefinite postponement (pp. 4-
5). 
Why these costs are greater than the downsides of practical 
equality is not completely clear. Those who did not benefit from 
the administration’s adjustments to the travel ban—adjustments 
that Tsai credits to the Ninth Circuit’s due process ruling—are 
now permanently deprived of relief. Maybe Tsai is correct that 
their suffering, summed over time, is comparatively less than the 
harm experienced by all those initially subject to the ban, if it was 
allowed to persist for a temporary period. But that calculation is 
complicated. 
Appeasement, for Tsai, means “openly adopting the 
objections of your opponents as your own” in order to achieve a 
measure of recognition for egalitarianism rather than none at all. 
 
 32.  See also p. 127 (criticizing the Court’s deferral in Korematsu, which was not 
released until after the president announced closure of the camps); id. (“[D]eferral is like 
a lousy rerun. We’ve seen it before and it never gets better.”). 
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(pp. 5-6; see also pp. 35-36) Tsai is wary of this strategy as well, 
because he thinks that colluding with opponents can work to 
perpetuate injustice. What he means, I think, is that appeasers aim 
to neutralize the aggression of another but they end up with the 
opposite effect—they unintentionally energize their opponent (p. 
7).33 As Micah Schwartzman and I have put the point, the term 
appeasement usually refers to a situation where one side accedes 
to another’s demands with the intent of disarming them, “but 
where that concession has the self-defeating effect of 
emboldening the other.”34 
Turning once more to the travel ban, Tsai argues that it 
would have been a mistake to concede that refugees could be 
blocked, even if that were the price for invalidating the 
prohibition on other travelers (p. 6). Nor would it have been wise 
to allow an emergency exception that made discrimination against 
Muslims permissible for reasons of national security (p. 6). Yet 
the majority opinion did effectively create a national security 
exception. So why Tsai equivocates on the wisdom of the travel 
ban decision (pp. 79-80) is somewhat puzzling. 
More generally, distinguishing practical equality from 
appeasement can sometimes be difficult. On the one hand, certain 
second-best solutions carry little risk of empowering 
discriminators. When the Ninth Circuit invalidated the travel ban 
on procedural grounds, for instance, Trump’s hand was not 
strengthened (pp. 75-76). On the other hand, however, some 
instances of practical equality are harder to distinguish from 
appeasement. In United States Agriculture v. Moreno, the Court 
invalidated a provision of the Food Stamp Act that excluded 
people who lived with anyone unrelated to them.35 The Court held 
that the provision was not rationally related to the prevention of 
fraud. Tsai cheers this outcome because it did something to 
protect indigent people, who were more likely to have roommates 
from outside their families (p. 110). But was it appeasement? 
 
 33.  “[T]he flaw with appeasement is that justice in half measures could leave future 
generations worse off” (p. 7). 
 34.  Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Against Establishment Clause Concession, 
TAKE CARE (Mar. 1, 2019), https://takecareblog.com/blog/against-establishment-clause-
concession. We explicitly disclaimed any historical reference carried by the term 
appeasement. 
 35.  United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
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Moreno was decided in the early 1970s, a time when 
constitutional actors were engaged in a serious debate over 
whether and how to protect poor people from government actions 
that worsened one of the most significant sources of inequality in 
America—and indeed over what inequality on the basis of wealth 
and income even entailed, as a matter of political morality and 
constitutional justice. In decisions like Moreno, the Court stopped 
short of declaring indigency to be a suspect classification, 
government use of which would have triggered a presumption of 
unconstitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause.36 Did that 
decision embolden those who wished to insulate market ordering 
from judicial oversight and constitutional critique? Did it 
contribute to the contemporary situation, in which indigent 
Americans find themselves without constitutional resources for 
arguing against historic levels of distributive injustice?37 Those 
questions seem hard to answer, and I am not sure how Tsai would 
respond.38 
IV. 
In response to this moment of political polarization, a trope 
seems to be emerging. Principled positions are characterized as 
divisive because they tend to stimulate defensive reactions that 
are equally strong, whereas pragmatic approaches promote 
reconciliation and offer a pathway to productive action. Tsai sets 
up a similar tension between principle and practicality39 and he is 
 
 36.  See Bertrall Ross, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and 
the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 341 (2016) (“For a brief seven-year period in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, classifications on the basis of wealth stood on the same level as 
classifications on the basis on the basis of race—traditionally disfavored and subject to 
heightened judicial scrutiny. But after the addition of four conservative Justices in the early 
1970s, the Court reversed course and ultimately determined that wealth was not a suspect 
classification and that the poor were not a suspect class.”). A key decision in the reversal, 
handed down the same year as Moreno, was San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 37.  But see Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 
94 B.U.L. REV. 671 (2014) (exhuming an American constitutional tradition supporting 
socio-economic rights). 
 38.  For an example that Tsai considers appeasement, consider the decision by some 
LGBT supporters to advocate for civil unions in the 1990s and 2000s (pp. 36–37). Did that 
decision encourage the impression that something short of civil marriage was all same-sex 
couples were entitled to, or was it a pragmatic step forward at a moment in history when 
marriage equality was not attainable?  
 39.  See, e.g., p. 6 (describing a “tussle between principle and realism”); p. 11 (arguing 
that practical equality “would best balance principle and realism”), p. 91 (describing 
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not alone—he has distinguished company.40 In his book, however, 
Tsai introduces an inventive twist, arguing that the principle of 
equality can be pursued without principled argument, by using 
other constitutional means to achieve ends that are the same or 
similar. 
But principle does not work that way, or at least it need not 
work that way. People use inductive reasoning to identify values 
or commitments that fairly abstract from more particular 
judgments that have withstood examination over time. These 
abstract commitments, or principles, are not rules that rigidly 
dictate outcomes.41 People use them to deduce solutions to 
contemporary problems, but that process is always complex and 
contestable. Moreover, principles don’t suggest outcomes alone—
they work together with concrete judgments, or precedents, to 
form a coherent set of convictions. Where the Constitution is 
involved, those convictions include text, history, structure, and 
past decisions that have come to be regarded as authoritative.42 In 
this manner, interpreters work toward solutions to contemporary 
problems that fit together not only with principles, but also with 
precedents and pragmatic considerations. And this way of 
thinking is dynamic, so that every element is revisable, including 
principles. 
Understood like that, constitutional interpretation does not 
necessarily pit principle against practical considerations. To say 
that it does is to dismiss the power of dissent prematurely, calling 
it rigid, without appreciating its dynamism or contingency. Many 
of the decisions that Tsai praises throughout his book could be 
understood as consistent with principle, on such a view. For 
instance, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the travel ban case was 
 
equality by other means as “both principled and pragmatic”), p. 39 (“pragmatism shies 
away from fixed principles and closed systems”). 
 40.  ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE UNNECESSARY CONFLICT BETWEEN GAY RIGHTS 
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 1, 4 (forthcoming, 2020) (“Principles are a distraction, which 
make each side’s claims seem more uncompromisable than they are . . . . Lawyers are 
trained to think about conflict resolution by devising abstract principles that should cover 
all future cases, and which incidentally entail that their side wins. But this is not the only 
way to think about conflict. Sometimes, the right thing to do is not to follow a principle, 
but to accurately discern the interests at stake and cobble together an approach that gives 
some weight to each of those interests.”). 
 41.  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22–23 (1977) 
(distinguishing principles from rules). 
 42.  This paragraph draws on NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN 
EGALITARIAN AGE 25–36 (2017). 
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not unprincipled—rather, it emphasized the importance of 
procedural due process (as well as substantive due process). That 
the court may also have responded to the political difficulties that 
an Establishment Clause opinion finding religious animus may 
have faced in the Ninth Circuit itself, or on certiorari review, does 
not mean that its opinion did not implement the norm of due 
process, an important constitutional ideal. Nor was the Moreno 
decision any more practical than it was principled—after all, the 
conviction that government may only coerce people on the basis 
of reasons that are public in the sense that they are accessible to 
those coerced is basic to liberal-egalitarian democracy. 
Lawyers on the left should welcome compromise in the many 
instances in which it can be supported by considerations of justice 
as applied to the real world. But where it cannot, compromise in 
itself may not be worth pursuing.43 Actually, I do not think Tsai 
himself suggests otherwise.44 But others who value the reduction 
of today’s political tension for its own sake may be constructing 
agreement on an unfirm foundation. Democratic principles can 
hold the United States together, and the United States is not likely 
to be held together without them. 
 
 
 43.  See Nelson Tebbe, Conscience and Equality, 31 J. C. R. & ECON. DEVEL. 1, 64–
66 (2018) (distinguishing between two forms of compromise, reasoned and unreasoned, 
and raising concerns about the second). There is a developed literature about compromise 
in political theory; I plan to address it in upcoming work. 
 44.  Tsai does sometimes seem to value consensus in itself (pp. 70–71, 75). Practical 
egalitarians want courts to make the right decisions, but they may not need consensus to 
do that, and there does not seem to be a necessary reason why consensus would have 
independent value, especially within a court. 
